St. Mary's Law Journal
Volume 7

Number 2

Article 6

6-1-1975

Customer-Bank Communication Terminals and Branch Banking.
Martha I. Macartney

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Martha I. Macartney, Customer-Bank Communication Terminals and Branch Banking., 7 ST. MARY'S L.J.
(1975).
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol7/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St.
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact sfowler@stmarytx.edu.

Macartney: Customer-Bank Communication Terminals and Branch Banking.

CUSTOMER-BANK COMMUNICATION TERMINALS
AND BRANCH BANKING
MARTHA I. MACARTNEY
Competition among banking institutions is aimed at capturing the banking
public by offering customer services and conveniences. While technology has
progressed and provided more efficient and flexible methods of banking, the
laws which regulate the banking system have not always kept pace. For
example, the federal branch banking law is currently being reevaluated in
light of certain innovative techniques which the drafters of that statute, almost
half a century ago, could not have envisioned.' One significant innovation
has been the development of customer-bank communication terminals which
have created a great deal of controversy due to the lack of regulation by any
banking law. A CBCT is an electronic device remote from a main bank or
its branches. 2 The machine can be operated only by those bank customers
who have cards which have been encoded with certain information on a magnetic strip.3 The customer inserts his card into a slot on the unit, taps out
his personal identification number, and the machine in turn identifies the customer from the previously encoded information. 4 The bank customer is then
permitted to select one of several transactions: a cash withdrawal from his
account; a crediting of funds to his account; a transfer between his checking
and savings accounts; or payment transfers from his account into accounts
maintained by other bank customers. 5
Electronic terminals, similar to CBCTs, have been allowed by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, which governs federal savings and loan associations,
1. National Banking Act of 1927, ch. 191, § 7(c), 44 Stat. 1228, as amended, 12
U.S.C. § 36 (1970).
2. There are two types of CBCTs-unmanned and manned. The CBCT may
,be self-contained (off-line), or it may be connected by wire (on-line) to a bank's
central computer at a remote location. Information which is not transmitted instantaneously to the central computer is recorded within the CBCT by tape or other
means and the tape periodically is removed and taken to the bank for processing.
All transactions conducted at a CBCT are subject to verification either by on-line
communication with the bank's computer or by later examination by the bank of
the tape and funds collected from the CBCT.
39 Fed. Reg.44416, 44417 (1974).
3. The cards used may be either a credit card such as "Master Charge," "Bankamericard" or a card issued by the bank. Typically, the encoded information consists
of a personal identification number, the customer's checking or savings account number,
the number of withdrawals permitted to him each day, and the date of expiration. The
encoded information might also contain the credit card number, as in Colorado v. First

Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979, 981 (D. Colo. 1975).

4. If the identification is not made, the card is often retained in the machine and
no transaction can be accomplished. Colorado v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979,
982 (D. Colo. 1975).
5. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1975).
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and the National Credit 'Union, which governs credit unions., These two
financial institutions together with national banks comprise the entire federal
banking system. In an attempt to maintain a competitive equality among
these institutions and to promote new and efficient modes of customer service,
the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States has issued an interpretive ruling permitting national banks to establish exclusive CBCTs within a
50 mile radius of their main bank or any of their branches regardless of state
boundaries. 7 According to the ruling, a CBCT could be established beyond
a 50 mile radius if one or more local financial institutions were able to share
the facility at a reasonable cost. 8 Under the federal branch banking statute,
a national bank's authority to establish branches within a state is subject to
state branch banking laws.9 To circumvent regulation under these state laws,
the Comptroller has determined that a CBCT does not constitute a "branch"
within the federal statutory definition and therefore need not comply with
the applicable state laws. 10
Several state banking boards are currently challenging this ruling because
of the potential competitive advantage it may give to the national banks
which would adversely affect the state chartered banks." If CBCTs are
branches the competitive balance between the national and state banks will
be unaffected. If, on the other hand, CBCTs are not branches the national
banks will be able to establish these customer service devices throughout the
state, while state banks will be prevented by their respective branch banking
statutes from installing similar facilities. Therefore, the states must either
accept the consequences of being outnumbered by national bank facilities or
enact legislation permitting their banks to establish electronic terminals.
The Comptroller's interpretive ruling raises four major issues: First, the
principal legal issue to be resolved is whether a CBCT is a branch; second,
what is the competitive impact of the ruling on interstate banking as between
national and state banks; third, whether the establishment of CBCTs should
be postponed, which would facilitate the making of a detailed analysis of
electronic banking. 12 Finally, whether CBCTs, as forerunners of electronic
banking, should be allowed regardless of their legal status.'8
6. See 39 Fed. Reg. 23991 (1974). The federal savings and loan associations'
terminals are called Reserve Service Units (RSUs) which are comparable to CBCTs.
For the National Credit Union's regulation, see 39 Fed. Reg. 30107 (1974).
7. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1974), as amended 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1975).
8. These financial institutions are those authorized to receive deposits, such as a

commercial bank, a mutual savings bank, a savings and loan association, or a credit
union. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1975).
9. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
10. Id. § 36(f).
11. Those challenging the ruling include the state bank commission of Colorado and
the Independent Bankers Association of America.
12. S. 1899, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The proposed temporary controls on
electronic funds transfer systems have recently been tabled in the Senate.
13. See 39 Fed. Reg. 44416 (1974) for a complete discussion of these issues.
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

In 1926, Representative McFadden introduced a bill to authorize national
banks to establish branches. Prior to this bill, the national banks created
by the National Bank Act of 1864 were at a competitive disadvantage to the
state banks because only state banks were permitted to engage in branching. 1 4 As enacted by Congress, the McFadden Act of 1927 contained three
significant provisions: First, it granted national banks the power to establish
branches within the municipal limits of the bank's location if state banks were
granted the same privilege by statute. 15 Second, the Act defined a branch
as: [A]ny branch bank, branch office, branch agency, additional office, or
any branch place of business . . . at which deposits are received, or checks

paid, or money lent. 16 Third, the McFadden Act limited the branching
ability of state chartered banks which were members of the Federal Reserve
System to "inside" branches. 17 The overall effect of the McFadden Act,
therefore, was to establish "competitive equality among the members of the
Federal Reserve System."' 8
While the definition of the term "branch" as defined in the McFadden Act
has remained unchanged, the branching powers of national banks were affected by the Banking Act of 1933.19 It is clear from the language and legislative history of Section (c)(2) of the McFadden Act that branch banking
by national banks was permissible "in only those states the laws of which permit branch banking, and only to the extent that the State laws permit branch
banking."' 20 As enacted, the 'Banking Act of 1933 allowed national banks
to establish "outside"2 1 branches if such branches could be established by
state banks under state laws. 22 This amendment to the McFadden Act en14. For a detailed historical analysis of the competitive disadvantage of the national
banks see 39 Fed. Reg. 44416 (1974).
15. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
16. Id. § 36(f).

17. "Inside" branches are branches within the limits of the city, town, or village in
which the parent bank is situated. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970). See also 39 Fed. Reg.
44416, 44417 (1974). The Act included a grandfather clause which allowed the state
banks to retain and operate the existing branches but were forbidden from establishing
any new branches which did not comply with the Act's requirements. First Nat'l Bank
v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 258 (1966).
18. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 258 (1966), citing
68 Cong. Rec. 5815 (1927). For a recent case reaffirming Congress' intent to accomplish "competitive equality" see Seattle Trust & Say. Bank v. Bank of Cal., 492 F.2d
48, 52 (9th Cir. 1974).
19. Compare National Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 44 Stat. 189 (1933) with McFadden Act, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1228 (1927), as amended 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970).
20. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 259 (1966), citing
76 Cong. Rec. 2511 (1933). (Remarks of Senator Carter Glass, the sponsor of the
amendment.)
21. "Outside" branches are branches beyond the limits of the city, town, or village
in which the parent bank is situated.

22. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (Supp. I, 1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
39 Fed. Reg. 44416, 44417 (1974).
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abled national and state banking associations to compete more equitably by
removing the restriction on statewide branching by national banks. This Act
also expanded the National Banking Act to permit statewide as opposed to
"limited" 23 branching by national banks to the extent that state banking institutions were expressly permitted to branch in accordance with their partic24
ular state law.
THE FEDERAL DEFINITION OF "BRANCH"

Although state law determines how, where, and when branch banks may

be operated, federal law defines what constitutes a branch.2 5 The United
States Supreme Court in First National Bank v. Dickinson20 rejected the contention that "state law definitions of what constitute 'branch banking' must
control the content of the federal definition. ' 27 Prior attempts by Congress to

inhibit the growth of state banking demonstrate the independence of the National Banking Act from state statutes regulating state chartered banks. 28
Chief Justice Burger, in the Dickinson decision, reaffirmed this independence
by stating that:

[I]n § 36(c) Congress entrusted to the states the regulation of branching
as Congress then conceived it. But to allow the states to define the content of the term 'branch' would make them the sole judges of their own
powers. Congress did not intend such an improbable result, as appears
29
from the inclusion in § 36(c) of a general definition of 'branch.'
Several courts have considered factors other than the statutory definitions
3 0
For
in determining whether a new banking institution is a branch bank.
23. "Limited" is a type of branch banking in which a bank is permitted to establish
branches within specifically defined areas such as a city or county.
24. Compare National Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 44 Stat. 189 (1933), with McFadden Act, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1228 (1927), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970). See
39 Fed. Reg. 44416, 44417 (1974).
25. North Davis Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 457 F.2d 820, 822 (10th Cir. 1972); see
National Bank v. Wayne Oakland Bank, 252 F.2d 537, 540 (6th Cir. 1958); 39 Fed.
Reg. 44416,44417 (1974).
26. 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
27. Id.at 133; 39 Fed. Reg. 44416, 44417 (1974).
28. Congress formerly gave special competitive advantages to national banks over
state banks in order to induce the state banks either to convert into national banking
associations or to cease operation. 39 Fed. Reg. 44416, 44418 (1974). When the state
banking system did not disappear, Congress enacted a 10 percent tax on state bank notes.
The 1865 statute achieved the desired result as the number of state chartered banks
diminished while the number of national banks increased considerably. Id. at 44418.
29. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 133-34 (1969). The standards
prescribed by 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) are applied by courts to determine what constitutes a
branch of a national bank. See North Davis Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 457 F.2d 820,
822 (10th Cir. 1972); 39 Fed. Reg. 44416, 44417 (1974).
30. See First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 136-37 (1969); First Nat'l
Bank v. First Bank Stock Corp., 306 F.2d 937, 942-43 (9th Cir. 1962); Nemirov v.
Bloom, 445 P.2d 214, 215 (Colo. 1968); Goldy v. Crane, 445 P.2d 212, 214 (Colo.
1968); Tri-City Bank v. State, 197 N.W.2d 332, 334 (Ct. App. Mich. 1972).
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example, in First National Bank v. First Bank Stock Corp.,3 ' the United
States Court of Appeals explained that if the banking facility in question is
conducting business with the parent bank as if both were one institution, this
facility is a branch.32 The court also pointed out that independent capital
structures and loan bases are strong evidence that the banking facility is operating independently of the main bank and therefore is not a branch.A3 Moreover, it has been held that common control through stock ownership is not
4
sufficient proof that the facility is a branch.
The Michigan Court of Appeals in Tri-City Bank v. State,3 5 examined the
manner of operation of two facilities in determining whether one was a
branch bank. The court pointed out that while in this case the original facility had changed its name, it had not changed the physical features of the
office.3 6 Additionally, the recently established Warren bank was paying the
salaries as well as insurance coverage of the employees of both banks.3 7 By
using an intermediary, Tri-City Services, the Southgate employees performed
banking functions for the Warren bank. Despite the fact these were two different corporations, in reality they were one entity. Thus, the court ruled
that the bank was operating in violation of the branch banking laws.
Because the McFadden Act definition has not been updated to encompass
the modern facilities employed by banks and not expressly covered by the
definition, it is questionable whether a particular banking facility is the type
of branch bank contemplated under the 1927 statute.3 8 In response to the
advancement of computer technology in the commercial world, the means of
accomplishing customer services have been modernized. Because of the lack
of express statutory regulations prohibiting the operation of certain modern
devices, some banks have implemented facilities such as drive-in tellers and
pickup and delivery services. Consequently, the question of whether these
new innovations are a circumvention of the federal and state branch banking
limitations has frequently been litigated in the courts. 39 For example, in
First National Bank v. Walker Bank and Trust Co.,40 the Utah Supreme
31. 306 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1962).
32. Id. at 942.
33. Nemirov v. Bloom, 445 P.2d 214, 215 (Colo. 1968); Goldy v. Crane, 445 P.2d
212, 214 (Colo. 1968); In re Application of Kenilworth, 230 P.2d 377, 380 (N.J. 1967).
34. First Nat'l Bank v. First Bank Stock Corp., 306 F.2d 937, 942-43 (9th Cir.
1962). A court may also consider other aspects which might grant a bank an advantage
in attracting customers. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 136-37 (1969).
35. 197 N.W.2d 332 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972).
36. Id. at 334.
37. Id. at 334.
38. See generally First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969); Howard v.
Citizens, 385 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1967); Camden Trust Co. v. Gidney, 301 F.2d 521,
524 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 886 (1962).
39. See generally First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969); Howard v.
Citizens, 385 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1967); Camden Trust Co. v. Gidney, 301 F.2d 521
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 886 (1962).
40. 425 P.2d 414 (Utah 1967).
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Court held that a drive-in teller, not physically attached to the main banking
office but connected by pneumatic tubes, was not a branch bank within the
41
meaning of a Utah statute prohibiting the establishment of branch banks.
Although these facilities accommodated both drive-in and walkup customers
for the purpose of receiving deposits, withdrawing funds, and cashing checks,
thus meeting the Utah statutory definition of branch banks, the court considered other factors in determining whether the drive-in tellers were branch
42
banks.
The physical attachment of a facility to the main bank was also emphasized in Jackson v. First National Bank.43 In Jackson, a national bank had
established a bank office supplementing the parent bank in accordance with
a Georgia statute.4 4 However, the bank'had subsequently established a noncontiguous drive-in facility approximately 300 feet from the main branch for
the purpose of cashing checks and receiving deposits. The Georgia District
Court enjoined the establishment of this facility, holding that it constituted
branch banking as defined under the McFadden Act 45 and under Georgia's

statutory definition of a "branch facility."' 4 6 The physical attachment or detachment of the other facility to the main bank appears to have been the
decisive factor in this type of situation.
The legal status of pickup and delivery services as possible branch banks
was first settled in 1969 in First National Bank v. Dickinson.47 A national

bank in Florida had obtained permission from the Comptroller to operate two
off-premises services: a mobile armored car and a stationary deposit receptacle. The bank operated an armored car (a mobile drive-in) staffed with
bank employees which delivered cash in exchange for checks and received
cash and checks at the depositor's premises. In addition, the bank main41. Id. at 419; UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 7, ch. 3 § 7-3-6 (1953). Generally, Utah prohibits its banks from establishing branches when there are other operating branches except by taking over an existing bank which has been in operation for not less than five
years. UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 7, ch. 3 § 7-3-6 (1953).
42. These other factors were: (1) The new facilities were constructed on property
owned by the main bank and were contiguous and immediately adjacent to the main
bank; (2) no other building or place of business separated the new facilities and the
main bank; (3) deposits and withdrawals were conducted via pneumatic tubes; (4) the
new facilities were constructed as close to the main bank building as the established
right-of-way would reasonably permit. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co.,
425 P.2d 414, 419 (Utah 1967).
43. 246 F. Supp. 134 (M.D. Ga. 1965).
44. Ga. Code Ann. § 13-201.1(a)(b) (Supp. 1965).
45. Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 F. Supp. 134, 138 (M.D. Ga. 1965); 12 U.S.C.
§ 36(f) (1970).
46. Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 F. Supp. 134, 138 (M.D, Ga. 1965); Ga. Laws
1960, pp. 67, 70; 1963, p. 602. The term "branch facility" was defined as:
[A]ny additional place of business of a parent bank or a branch bank located in
the particular city, town, or village in which said parent bank or branch bank is
situated and which has obtained a permit to operate a limited banking service. ...
Ga. Laws 1960, pp. 67, 70; 1963, p.602.
47. 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
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tained in a shopping center, a secured receptacle, to which the customers had
keys; the monies and night bags stored at this facility were picked up daily
by the armored car. Relying on the Comptroller's ruling, the bank entered
into a "dual control contract" whereby transmittal slips were filled out specifying the bank as the customer's agent during transport of the funds; however,
the bank insured the funds during transit. The United States Supreme Court

rejected these arrangements, holding that the term branch bank includes "any
place" where deposits are received. 48 Consequently, the Court thwarted this
systematic attempt by the national banks to secure branching privileges
through use of a mobile armored car and stationary deposit receptacle; privi-

leges which Florida denies to competing state banks. 49 This decision reaffirmed the congressional policy of competitive equality and its deference to
state standards. Since the Florida statute prohibited these modes of banking
services, the Court refused to allow the Comptroller to modify these standards
by his discretionary powers.5 0

Although the Comptroller's recent ruling on CBCTs is interpretive of a fed-

eral statute,5 ' it indirectly modifies state standards by totally disregarding
state branch banking prohibitions or limitations. The Comptroller has determined that a CBCT is not a branch; consequently, it is not subject to state
branch banking laws. 52 Until revised, this interpretation may be relied upon
by national banks. 3 As regulator of national banks, it is within the Comp48. Id. at 135.
49. Id. at 138.
50. Id. at 138.

51. The Comptroller's ruling reads in part:

Part 7 of 12 C.F.R. Chapter I is amended by revising § 7.7491 to read as follows:
§ 7.7491 Customer-Bank Communication Terminals.
(a) A national bank may receive and act upon communications from its customers transmitted through electronic devices or machines requesting the withdrawal of funds either from the customer's deposit account or from a previously authorized line of credit, or instructing the bank to receive funds or to transfer funds
for the customer's benefit. The device or machine may be established and operated
by the bank, by the customer, or by a third party. In accordance with the customer's request or instruction and subject to verification by the bank, cash or checks
may be received and cash may be dispensed at the location of the device or
machine. The device or machine may not be staffed by a bank employee, except
that the bank for a reasonable period of time may provide an employee to instruct
and assist customers in the operation of the device or machine. Any transactions
initiated by such a device or machine shall be subject to verification by the bank
either by direct wire transmission or otherwise. A 'bank may provide insurance protection under its bonding program for transactions involving such a device or
machine.
40 Fed. Reg. 21700, 21703-21704 (1974).
52. 39 Fed. Reg.44416, 44418 (1974).,
,53. Analogous situations inwhich decisions outside of the strict statutory power of
federal officials have been upheld. See American Trucking Ass'n v.United States, 344
U.S. 298, 308-13 (1953); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216,
223 (1943); Altman v. McClintock, 20 F.2d 226, 231-32 (D. Wy.), appeal dism'd, 28
F.2d 1607 (1927).
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troller's authority to interpret the "branch" definition of the McFadden Act.54
In addition, as supervisor of national banks, the Comptroller has been
accorded broad discretion in the field of national banking. This authority
is not without limitations, 5 for his findings are subject to judicial review and
reversal. 6 His ruling that CBCTs are not branches must be examined by
applying the branch definition to the electronic terminal.
APPLICATION OF THE "BRANCH" DEFINITION

The McFadden Act contains a two-part definition of what constitutes a
branch. 57 The primary statutory question is whether a CBCT satisfies the
first part of the definition by being a "branch bank, branch office, branch
agency, additional office, or any branch place of business."5 8 The Comptroller has argued that a CBCT is not an "office" because not all the transactions associated with a banking office or place of business can be initiated
at a CBCT.5 9 A CBCT does not, for example, allow a customer to open
an account with the bank, apply for a loan, purchase savings bonds, obtain
money orders, cashiers checks, or travellers checks, maintain a safe deposit
box, cash travellers checks, or exchange currency.
Because of 'the nature
of its functions, the CBCT is available only to existing bank customers. 61 The CBCT has been recently analogized to a mail box, telephone,
or a telex machine through which a customer communicates with his bank
to accomplish certain transactions such as making deposits and transferring
funds. 62 These types of facilities have not been challenged as branches, however, because of the vital function they perform and their acceptance by the
financial community.
Generally, legislators have regarded both teller windows and branches as
having certain physical and personnel characteristics, 63 although some legis54. See Ramapo Bank v. Camp, 425 F.2d 333, 341, 347 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 828 (1970). Cf. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965). See also 39 Fed. Reg.
44416, 44418 (1974).

55. See Seattle Trust & Say. Bank v. Bank of Cal., 492 F.2d 48, 50-51 (9th Cir.
1974); First Nat'l Bank v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267, 272 (4th Cir. 1965); Community Nat'l
Bank v. Saxon, 310 F.2d 224, 226-27 (6th Cir. 1962).
56. For examples of situations in which the Comptroller's rulings have been revised,

see Note, National Banks-National Banks Need Not Comply With State Banking Laws
When Seeking to Relocate Principal Office and Retain the Former as a Branch, 24

L.REV. 175, 177 (1970).
57. 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1970).

VAND.

58.

Id.

See also 39 Fed. Reg.44416, 44418 (1974).

59. 39 Fed. Reg. 44416, 44418 (1974).
60. ld. at 44418.
61. For a discussion of this customer limitation see Independent Bankers of Oregon
v. Camp, 357 F.Supp. 1352, 1355 (D.Ore. 1973). See also 39 Fed. Reg. 44416, 44418
(1974).

62. Colorado v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979, 982 (D. Colo. 1975). The
Comptroller of the Currency was also named as a defendant inthis action, thus challenging his authority as well as his interpretive ruling. 39 Fed. Reg. 44416, 44418
(1974).
63. 39 Fed. Reg. 44416, 44418 (1974), citing 67 Cong. Rec. 2860, 3230 (1926).
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lators have viewed branches in functional rather than physical terms.6 4 Admittedly, GBCTs do not have the traditional physical attributes of a branch
facility nor do they strictly comply with the personnel characteristic. Some
electronic terminals are manned, but these are operated by a bona fide party
under contract to -the bank. It is generally required that this third party not
be an employee or an agent of the bank, thus avoiding the personnel characteristic. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
recently rejected !the Comptroller's contention that physical characteristics
determined a branch bank."6 The court interpreted the definition of the
McFadden Act as having a "calculated indefiniteness" which dictates only
the minimum requirement of a branch bank.""
The Comptroller has also argued that even if a CBCT is a branch bank
or branch place of 'business it does not receive deposits, pay checks, or make
loans within the meaning of the federal branch definition. 67 CBCTs, however, allow the customer to conduct the following types of transactions: (1)
cash withdrawals from demand accounts, savings accounts, and credit card
accounts; (2) deposits to demand accounts or to savings accounts; and (3)
transfers from demand to savings accounts, or from savings to demand accounts, or from credit card to demand accounts."8 Authentication and verification of these transactions are prerequisites to deposits being considered
received or checks paid or money lent. 69 At their current stage of develop70
ment, CBCTs are not sophisticated enough to accomplish these procedures.
A deposit transaction is not consummated until the customer's funds, stored
at the CBCT, have been collected and processed by the bank according to
the customer's request. 7' A customer may record his instructions upon a tape
or other medium if an off-line unmanned terminal is involved; whereas, with
an on-line terminal the customer communicates instantaneously with the
72
bank. The United States District Court in Colorado v. First National Bank
rejected the idea that notification, receipt, and verification of a deposit occurs
at the bank. The court held that an off-line customer service machine was
64. 39 Fed. Reg. 44416, 44418 (1974), citing 68 Cong. Rec. 5816 (1927)

(Repre-

sentative McFadden); 67 Cong. Rec. 2855 (1926) (Representative Kurtz); 67 Cong.
Rec. 3248 (1926) (Representative Cannon).
65. Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, No. 75-0089 (D.D.C. July 31, 1975).
66. Id.
67. 39 Fed. Reg. 44416, 44419 (1974).

68. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1975).
69. Id. Most banks use a deposit slip which contains a provision to the effect that
the deposit is accepted subject to verification and the provisions of the Uniform Com-

mercial Code. Therefore, a "deposit" at a bank is equally as tentative as one at a
CBCT. In both instances, verification which occurs at the bank is necessary to hold
the bank liable.
70. Id.
71. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1975).

72. 394 F. Supp. 979 (D. Colo. 1975).
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the location at which deposits are received and not the bank. 73 In rejecting
the Comptroller's interpretation of the time at which deposits are made, the
court relied upon First National Bank v. Dickinson.7 4 In Dickinson, the
United States Supreme Court stated that:
Unquestionably, a competitive advantage accrues to a bank that provides
the service of receiving money for deposit at a place away from its main
office; the convenience to the customer is unrelated to whether the relationship of debtor 75and creditor is established at the moment of receipt
or somewhat later.
The Colorado District Court saw "no functional difference" between the
manner in which a customer makes a deposit at a CBCT and the stationary
receptacle for deposits discussed in Dickinson.76 The court concluded that
to the extent of this single function of receiving deposits, the machine in question was a branch under 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) and not authorized 'to operate
under Colorado's branch banking laws. 77 The Colorado decision further indicated that on-line terminal service would also be deemed a receipt of deposits. 78 In both on-line and off-line CBCTs there is a delay betweeen the
customer's making what he considers a deposit and the bank's receiving the
customer's funds to implement his instructions. Since the court determined
that the CBCT had received the deposit even without the main bank's knowledge of the transaction, the Comptroller's argument for an on-line CBCT
would be even more tenuous because the bank is instantaneously notified of
the customer's transaction and thus has more warning of the debtor-creditor
relationship the customer seeks to create.
Following the Colorado decision, the United States District Court, in Independent Bankers Association v. Smith 79 held that a facility, either off-line or
on-line, which transacts the same business as the main bank is a branch.
Thus, the court held that receiving deposits through CBCTs was branch bank80
ing.
Both the Comptroller and the Colorado District Court relied on the Uniform Commercial Code's definition of a check in concluding that a cash withdrawal from a CBCT is not "paying a check" within the language of 12
U.S.C. § 36(f). 81 The withdrawal is typically activated by a plastic card
which is not a check; a check being "a draft drawn on a bank and payable
on demand."8 2 Although the Colorado court acknowledged that using the
73. Id. at 984.
74. 396 U.S. 122 (1969).

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
C.F.R.
82.

Id. at 137.
Colorado v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979, 984 (D. Colo. 1975).
Id. at 984; see COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 11-6-101(1) (1973).
Colorado v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979, 984 (D. Colo. 1975).
No. 75-0089 (D.D.C. July 31, 1975).
Id.
Colorado v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979, 984-85 (D. Colo. 1975); 12
§ 7.7491 (1975).
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-104(2) (1972).
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machine and presenting a check accomplished the same result, it held that
this similarity was not controlling.8 3 It emphasized that the means by which
the customer communicates with the bank was the difference between the
two transactions. 84 Thus, the district court applied a literal construction of
the "branch" definition while admitting that both methods performed the
85
same function.
According to the Comptroller and the Colorado District Court, a cash withdrawal from an open-end credit account, such as a credit card or approved
overdraft, does not constitute a loan at the bank. 86 The customer is drawing
against a prearranged line of credit which is subject to verification at the bank
that the withdrawal was within the approved line of credit.8 7 Even though
such a transaction is a loan, the cash withdrawal from a credit card does not
constitute branch banking. The Colorado District Court omitted the fact that
a credit card company is an independent third party corporation, unassociated
with the bank.8 8 Such a corporation does not, therefore, satisfy the initial
requirement of the branch definition as a "branch office, branch agency, .
office or any branch place of business." 89
The United States District Court, for the District of Columbia, in Independent Bankers Association v. Smith,90 chose a functional construction of

the ,McFadden Act by declaring the Comptroller's interpretive ruling to be
null and void. 91 The court dismissed the Comptroller's arguments by resorting to the legislative history and case law of 12 U.S.C. § 36(f). 9 2 Both the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 93 and the Colorado
District Court 94 based their decision on First National Bank v. Dickinson.9 5 In

Dickinson, the Supreme Court stated:
Although the definition may not be a model of precision, in part due to
its circular aspect, it defines -the minimum content of the term 'branch';
use of the word 'include' the definition suggests a calculated indefiniteness with respect to the outer limits of the term. However, the term
'branch bank' at the very least includes any place for receiving deposits
or paying checks or lending money apart from the chartered premises,
it may include more. 9 6
83. Colorado v. First Natl Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979, 984-85 (D.Colo. 1975).
84. Id. at 984-85.
85. id. at 985.
86. Colorado v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979, 985 (D. Colo. 1975); 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.7491 (1975).
87. Colorado v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979, 985 (D. Colo. 1975); 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.7491 (1975).
88. Colorado v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979 (D. Colo. 1975).
89. 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1970).
90. No. 75-0089 (D.D.C. July 31, 1975).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Colorado v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979 (D. Colo. 1975).
95. 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
96. Id. at 135.
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Thus, the Court indicated that the McFadden Act should be read broadly,
97
that is, from a functional as opposed to narrow or literal viewpoint.
In the Independent Bankers Association decision, the court cited Representative McFadden's comment in the definitional section of the Act, that
"any place outside of or away from the main bank where the bank. . . transaot[s] any business carried on at the main bank, is a branch. ' 9 8 Therefore,
the court reasoned that since a CBCT conducts business transactions similar
to those of the main bank, a CBCT is a branch. 99 Currently, the Comptroller
is enjoined from further implementation of his ruling, thus leaving national
banks in a quandary. 100 This decision is having a nationwide impact because
it attacks all units in operation that conflict with state branch banking restrictions. Although this is the present judicial interpretation, the future of electronic banking will be resolved by the United States Supreme Court.
A strong argument can be advanced for a functional as opposed to a literal
construction of the Act especially since Representative McFadden, the
sponsor of the "branch" definition, viewed branches in functional terms. A
functional approach would determine the nature of the activity from the functions it performs, whereas a literal view would confine the interpretation to
the precise language of the statute. The intention to regulate banking institutions which accomplish certain transactions should govern the construction
and application of the statute rather than the exact words of the Act. If
the literal approach is correct, Congress has allowed the law regulating the
banking system to be antiquated by the technological advances in the industry. If, however, a functional approach is adopted, the drafters of the statute incorporated a durational quality in the Act, anticipating its progressive
reinterpretation in the future.
There has been no judicial determination of whether a manned on-line
CBCT is a branch. An example of a manned CBCT is a point of sale (POS)
terminal located at a commercial, non-bank establishment, such as a supermarket, which is financially involved in the transaction. All the customer's
transactions occurring as a result of the sale of goods or services are recorded
with the bank, however, the bank customer is regarded as dealing not with
the bank but directly with the third party. 10 Nevertheless, the bank is essential to the transaction. The bank's computer notifies the customer that the
third party has the funds necessary to the transaction and validates the customer's card. 10 2 All transactions involving the bank, such as deposits, with97. Id. at 135.
98. Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, No. 75-0089 (D.D.C. July 31, 1975), citing 68 Cong. Rec. 5816 (1927).
99. Id.
100. Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, No. 75-0089 (D.D.C. July 31, 1975).
101. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1975).
102. Id.
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drawals, or transfers are consummated at the bank under the Comptroller's
analysis. 10 3 The third party is not considered an agent of the bank because
it is acting in furtherance of its own business purposes.104 If the test announced in Independent Bankers Association v. Smith

°3

was applied to

manned CBCTs, the facilities would be deemed branches because of the similarity of the functions they and the main bank perform.
Wide discretion has been afforded the Comptroller in the field of national
banking.1 06 Therefore, even if a CBCT is not a branch bank, the Comptroller might control CBCTs to protect the banking system. The Comptroller
should not, however, exercise this supervisory power merely to preserve the
status quo. Many banks burdened by geographic restrictions will be faced
with a competitive adjustment from traditional banking methods to an electronic system in which time and distance are irrelevant. 10 7 Therefore, the
Comptroller has adopted several policies: First, any national bank seeking
to establish a CBCT must first give 30 days written notice to the Comptroller
containing the information specified in the interpretive ruling; second, the
Comptroller has ruled that national banks are permitted, but not required,
to share their CBCTs with any other financial institution; 0 8 third, the Comptroller has urged national banks not to establish CBCTs prior to July 1, 1975,
in any state in which state chartered banks are prohibited by state law from
establishing a similar facility.' 0 9 This delay is designed to give the state legislatures time to decide whether they wish to place their state chartered banks
on an equally competitive footing with national banks.
STATUTORY REGULATION IN THE STATES

State reaction to the advent of CBCTs and electronic banking has been
varied. Three states, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Washington passed legislation in 1974 which specifically authorizes an electronic funds transfer system (EFTS) but does not treat these facilities as branches."10 Of these
103. Id. The bank and the third party can also contractually arrange for the bank
to assume the risk of dishonor. The assumption of the risk is usually subject to compliance with various bank procedures, including the possibility of charging the face amount
of a check so processed back to the customer's account. Id.
104. Id.
105. No. 75-0089 (D.D.C. July 31, 1975).
106. Ramapo Bank v. Camp, 425 F.2d 333, 341 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828

(1970).
107. 39 Fed. Reg. 44416, 44420 (1974).
108. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1975). Sharing is mandatory if the CBCT is being established beyond a 50 mile radius of the national bank or one of its branches.
109.

39 Fed. Reg. 44416, 44420 (1974).

110. Other states which specifically exclude these facilities as branches are: FLA.
1975 Legislature; Md. H.B.
630, § (E), 1975 Legislature; NEB. RaV. STAT. § 8-157(3) (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 6-09-34 (Supp. 1975); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 19-29-1 (Supp. 1975). See also
STAT. ANN. § 659.062 (Supp. 1975); Kan. S.B. 515 § (f),

39 Fed. Reg. 44416, 44419 (1974).
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states, Massachusetts is the least specific in stating what functions may be
performed by a remote unmanned facility."1
Washington, on the other
hand, permits the facility to accept deposits, dispense cash, and make account
transfers. 11 2 The Washington statute is silent, however, on whether or not
lines of credit or overdraft privileges are available through unmanned remote
tellers. Oregon's statute is the broadest of the three states.'
It allows the
unmanned remote facilities to conduct general banking business." 4 Both
Massachusetts and Washington require advance supervisory approval,
whereas Oregon requires only notice for the first four units, after which approval is required." 5 The owner or lessee of the facility must notify the
Superintendent of Banks within 30 days of the removal or installation of a
CBCT. 116
Several states have enacted EFTS legislation. Kansas and Nebraska, for
11 7
example, have developed their own enabling and regulatory schemes.
Both permit banks to establish unmanned remote facilities which accomplish
banking transactions such as deposits, withdrawals, account transfers, and
pre-authorized loans. 1 8 Both states also provide that sharing by like institutions is mandatory, but both are silent on sharing by unlike institutions."19
Most other states, however, maintain that sharing by like and unlike institutions is permissible and not mandatory.' 20 Generally, the states require that
sharing be accomplished on a nondiscriminatory basis, conditioned upon pay111. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.

ch. 1147 (1974).

112. WASH. REV. CODE § 62.41.201 (Supp. 1974).
113. Ore. Laws 1974, ch. 797.

114. Id.
115. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 1147 (1974); Ore. Laws 1974, ch. 797; WASH. REV.
CODE § 62.41.201 (Supp. 1974). Florida also requires only notice. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 659.062 (Supp. 1975).
116. Ore. Laws 1974, ch. 797.
117. Compare Kan. S.B. 515, §§ 1(d)(1), (2), 1975 Legislature with NEB. REV.
STAT. § 8-157(3) (Supp. 1975) (effective January 1, 1976).
118. Compare Kan. S.B. 515, § l(d)(1), 1975 Legislature with NEB. REV. STAT. §
8-157(3) (Supp. 1975). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 75-373 (Supp. 1975); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, §§ 334(1)-(2), 342(35) (Supp. 1975); N.J. REV. STAT. §
17:9(A)(I) (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-02 (Supp. 1975).
119. Compare Kan. S.B. 515, § 1(g), 1975 Legislature with NEaB. REv. STAT. § 8157(3) (Supp. 1975).

"Like institutions" determines whether similar institutions are re-

quired or permitted to share facilities (banks and banks, savings and loans and savings
and loans). "Unlike institutions" refers to sharing between banks and thrifts and thrifts
and banks.
120. Sharing is permissible between like and unlike institutions in these states. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 659.062 (Supp. 1975); Ga. S.B. 149, 1975 Legislature; MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 167 § 65 (Supp. 1974); Md. H.B. 630, 1975 Legislature; N.J. REV. STAT. 17:9
(A)(1) (Supp. 1975); Ore. Laws 1974, ch. 797; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 19-29-1 (Supp.
1975); WASH. REV. CODE § 62.41.201 (Supp. 1974) (refers to mutual savings banks
and savings and loan associations). On the other hand, sharing is mandatory in CoNN.
GEN. STAT. REV. § 75-373 (Supp. 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 339 (Supp.

1975); N.H.S.B. 255, 1975 Legislature; N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-02 (Supp. 1975);

WASH. REV. CODE § 62.41.201 (Supp. 1974).
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ment of a reasonable proportion of all costs, including a reasonable return on
capital expenditures incurred in connection with the development, installation,
and operation of the electronic facility.1 21 Entry of automated facilities into
a state by out-of-state banking institutions is prohibited in some states while
other state statutes are silent on the issue. 1 22 None of the states, however,
expressly authorize out-of-state entry.
"Wild card" legislation which establishes parity with federally regulated
financial institutions, including federal savings and loans associations, has
been enacted in Maryland, North Dakota, and Virginia. 123 In Virginia, the
State Corporation Committee has the authority to define a branch so as to
achieve this parity with national banks. 1 24 In Maryland, New Hampshire,
and Rhode Island the banking authority may promulgate rules and regulations for the operation and sharing of facilities to the same extent as those
regulations promulgated by the Comptroller of the Currency with respect to
national banks. 125 In addition to the Comptroller's regulations, New Hampshire also considers the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's regulations regarding federal savings and loan associations. 1 26 Rhode Island, on the other
hand, provides that every financial institution may establish CBCTs to the
same extent but only during the time that competing financial institutions,
federally regulated and domiciled in the state, are permitted. 127 Utah, in
contrast, has declared a moratorium on the EFTS issue until July 1, 1976.128
It permits the Commissioner of Financial Institutions to authorize experimental EFTS. The Utah statute further provides that if a court or Congress
authorizes establishment of electronic funds transfer systems in Utah prior to
July 1, 1976, the Commissioner will grant financial institutions the same
authority. 129
Providing adequate security for the electronic devices is of primary concern
to the banks. Although several states advocate that sufficient safeguards be
121. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 659.062 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE § 62.41.201 (Supp.1974).
122. Prohibit: CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 75-373 (Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 659.062 (Supp. 1975); Kan. S.B. 515, 1975 Legislature; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9B, § 339 (Supp. 1975); Md. H.B. 630, 1975 Legislature; MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
167 § 65 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-157 (Supp. 1975); N.J. REV. STAT. § 17:9
(A) (1) (Supp. 1975). Silent: Ga. S.B. 149, 1975 Legislature; N.H.S.B. 255, 1975 Legislature; N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-02 (Supp. 1975); Ore. Laws 1974, ch. 797; WASH.
REV. CODE § 62.41.201 (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. § 221.14 (Supp. 1974).
123. Md. H.B. 630, 1975 Legislature; N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-02 (Supp. 1975); VA.
CODE ANN. § 6.1-39 (Supp. 1975). See also N.H.S.B. 255, 1975 Legislature; R.I. GEN.
LAws ANN. § 19-29-1 (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. § 221.14 (Supp. 1974).
124. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-39 (Supp. 1975).
125. Md. H.B. 630, § F, 1975 Legislature; N.H.S.B. 255, § 1, 1975 Legislature; R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 19-29-1 (Supp. 1975).
126. N.H.S.B. 255, § I(a), (b), 1975 Legislature.
127. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 19-29-1 (Supp. 1975).
128. Utah S.B. 100, 41st Legis. Sess. (1975).
129. id. § 6(1).
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incorporated into the systems, only Kansas has attempted to deliniate such
measures. 13 0 The statute governing the establishment of remote service units
by savings and loan associations clearly states that these security devices are
3
the minimum requirements and not an exclusive list.' 1
State legislation has also dealt with manned remote facilities. Some states
permit deposits, withdrawals, account transfers, and pre-authorized loans to
be performed; the same functions being allowed at unmanned remote facilities. 132 An analysis of the statutes reveals that most of the states require
the manned facility to be operated by a third party under contract. 1 33 Generally, the states maintain the same standards for both unmanned and
13 4
manned units.
CONCLUSION

A customer-bank communication terminal is an electronic means by which
a bank customer may communicate with the bank concerning the disposition
of his account. Whether this business constitutes branch banking depends
partly on whether a literal or functional construction of the McFadden Act

is to be employed. Because a CBCT does not fit the statutory language, a
literal application of the statute would support the Comptroller's position. If
a functional approach is applied, some if not all of a CBCTs transactions
would constitute branch banking. In Colorado v. First National Bank,13 5 the
Colorado Federal District Court decided the deposit issue against the Comptroller but held in his favor with respect to the withdrawal and loan aspects
of the CBCT. 136 By contrast, the Federal District Court for the District of
Columbia in Independent Bankers Association v. Smith, 13 7 held against the
130. Kan. S.B. 519, 1975 Legislature; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 659.062 (Supp. 1975); Md.
H.B. 630, 1975 Legislature.
131. Kan. S.B. 519, § 5, 1975 Legislature. More protective measures are required
for the unmanned than for the manned facility such as: adequate lighting; tamper-resistant locks on the exterior unit; an alarm system; and security provisions that prevent
interference with data communication linkage by a foreign source. For the manned facility, only the last device mentioned above is a condition of operation.
132. See, e.g., Kan. S.B. 515, 1975 Legislature; N.J. REV. STAT. § 17:9(A)(1) (Supp.
1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-02 (Supp. 1975).
133. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 75-373 (Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 659.062(1)
(c) (Supp. 1975); Md. H.B. 630, § C, 1975 Legislature; ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 9B, § 339 (Supp. 1975) (employees of business where facility located); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 8-157(3) (Supp. 1975) (nonbank employees can assist in transactions originated at
the facilities, and such assistance is not deemed to be engaging in the business of banking); N.J. REV. STAT. § 17:9(A)(1) (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-02 (Supp.

1975); Ore. Laws 1974, ch. 797, § 4.
134. For example, most states require advanced supervisory approval for the establishment of either type of facility. See Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, North
Carolina, New Jersey, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. This approval is
usually based on convenience to the public. See, e.g., Florida, Washington, and Utah.
135. 394 F. Supp. 979 (D. Colo. 1975).
136. Id.
137. No. 75-0089 (D.D.C. July 31, 1975).
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Comptroller on all the CBCTs functions. 138 Thus, while one court has
taken a literal approach to the Act another has applied a functional analysis.
Although the specific point of controversy is whether national banks should
be able to establish CBCTs regardless of state boundaries, the main issue is
whether electronic banking, regardless of its status, should be allowed. The
arguments for and against electronic banking deal primarily with economic
and policy considerations rather than legal reasoning.
The competitive impact of electronic banking and the Comptroller's ruling
in particular on state banks is of major concern in the banking industry. The
Independent Bankers Association of America l3 9 has taken the position that
the Comptroller's ruling will lead to a disparity between the limitations on
state and national banks. 140 State banks will remain geographically restricted
by their state statutes while national banks will be unrestricted. 14' Moreover,
because the 31 states which limit or prohibit branch banking are those states
in which 90 percent of the national banks are located, the ruling will effectively create statewide branching in these states. 142 The national banks will
be able to establish and operate CBCTs throughout the state because they
are not branches and therefore not subject to state branching restrictions. If
this situation occurs there would be an increase in concentration of national
banks which could lead to rigidity of prices and services and possibly foster
cQllusion, 143 instead of offering more efficient services and lower costs to
the bank customers. It is possible that the interpretive ruling may result in
a competitive imbalance between state and national banks but these differences are those inherent in a dual banking system.' 44 Although national
banks are regulated uniformly by Congress, state chartered banks are governed by each particular state's laws. Thus, national bank practices do not
always produce the same result, as far as business advantages are concerned,
when interwoven with the state statutes. In response to this situation, the
Comptroller has urged temporary limitations in an attempt to minimize any
competitive advantages and disadvantages which might result from his
145
ruling.
The Comptroller's ruling was in large part prompted by recent regulations
of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board permitting the establishment of re138. Id.
139. The Independent Bankers Association of America is a trade association which
represents over 7,300 state and federally chartered commercial banks.
140. Statement-Consultant-IndependentBankers Association of America Before the
Comptrollerof the Currency at 3-4 (April 2, 1975).
141. Id. at 2-3.
142. Id. at 3.
143. Id. at 5.
144. See 39 Fed. Reg. 44416, 44419 (1974).
145. 39 Fed. Reg.44416, 44420 (1974).
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mote service units by federally chartered savings and loan associations. 14
Similar regulations have been issued for credit unions by the National Credit
Union Administration. 1 47 In some states, such as Nebraska, savings and loan
associations have already taken advantage of the regulations. 148 First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Lincoln, Nebraska, for example, has
installed point-of-sales terminals in certain supermarkets through which cash
or cash items are received or disbursed.
By installing such a point-of-sales terminal, a national bank would treat
these terminals as CBCTs and appropriate notice to the Comptroller prior
to installation would be required. The Comptroller's ruling specifically excludes from all reporting requirements, however, a terminal whose sole function is to accomplish an electronic funds transfer in payment for goods and
services received, and through which neither cash is dispensed nor cash or
checks left for deposit.' 49 Such a limited point-of-sales terminal is not within
the intended scope of the Comptroller's regulation. For example, most of
the 6,000 point-of-sales terminals contemplated in the EFTS network being
planned by Credit Systems, Inc. of St. Louis, Missouri, will not receive or
dispense cash and therefore will not require 30 days notice from any bank. 150
Despite the Comptroller's exclusion of this type of system, federal savings and
loan associations and federal credit unions have greater latitude than national
banks to establish these EFTS.
The Comptroller is attempting to provide a means by which the commercial banking industry can meet this competition. If the McFadden Act is
strictly interpreted, the national banking system might be weakened through
the loss of customers to the remote CBCTs offered by credit unions and savings and loan associations.' 5 ' Because of the electronic communication technology employed, CBCTs will also practically eliminate insufficient-funds
checks and bad-check losses to merchants. The possibility still exists, of
course, that a card used for identification and credit rating could be altered,
but this is much more remote a possibility than the present actuality of forged
and worthless checks.1 52 Such electronic banking should also stabilize the
cost of processing billions of pieces of paper now relied upon to make the
payments system work. National banks should be allowed to establish
CBCTs because of the efficiency, convenience, and flexibility they offer to
the public.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See 39 Fed. Reg. 23991 (1974).
39 Fed. Reg. 30107 (1974).
See 39 Fed. Reg. 44416, 44419 (1974).
12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1975).
Dep't of Treasury, Press Release (May 9, 1975).
See 39 Fed. Reg. 44416, 44420 (1974).

152. Due to the current problem of stolen cards, banks have activated "hot lists"
composed of the stolen card numbers which will not initiate a transaction at the terminal. Difficulty in accommodating the increasing number of stolen cards has led some
banks to create temporary time periods for which a stolen card remains on the "hot list."
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Potential anti-trust violations are perhaps the most serious problem posed
by establishing CBCTs. Although the Comptroller did not require national
banks within the 50 mile radius to share these devices with other financial
institutions, he did not specifically prohibit such sharing. 15 3 He did, however,
require sharing of those CBCTs established beyond the 50 mile radius and
that they be "available at a reasonable cost."'1 54 Sharing of a CBCT system
by two or more competitors capable of supporting their own network might
raise anti-trust issues if the practice were to discourage competition and innovation. The Independent Bankers Association advocates a coordination and
cooperation between financial institutions but seeks safeguards to protect the
public against risks inherent in the sharing of a CBCT system by competitors. 155

In the past the Comptroller has not been required to take potential antitrust problems into consideration while approving the establishment of a
branch bank.' 56 If CBCTs are not branches the anti-trust issue of sharing
facilities arises. Because the ruling does not attempt to settle the anti-trust
problem, it places the burden upon the anti-trust agencies to prevent illegal
price fixing or market sharing devices. If, on the other hand, CBCTs are
branches, problems of monopoly, anti-trust, and competitive imbalance will
be caused by the fact that national banks will be severely restricted, whereas
the other federal financial institutions such as the savings and loan associations and credit unions will not be restricted.
Senate Bill 1899, presently tabled in the 'United States Senate, was introduced to establish certain temporary controls on electronic funds transfer
systems. 15 7 These temporary restraints were to be imposed on electronic
branch facilities for one year and would apply to national banks, federal savings and loan associations, and federal credit unions.' 5 8 This bill allowed
some experimentation with EFTS while curbing any uncontrolled spread of
the systems. The moratorium was designed to provide the National Commission on Electronic 'Funds Transfer with the time to investigate the impact of
Unfortunately these cards have been utilized after the expiration of this period to effect
unauthorized transactions.
There are two basic systems which the bank may use for customer identification purposes (a negative file and a positive file). The negative file contains a list of the cus-

tomers that are not entitled to conduct any transactions at the CBCT because of overdraft or some other deficiency in credit rating. The disadvantage with this type of system is that it has to be updated in order to be effective. This updating is particularly
more inconvenient to the bank if the CBCT is off-line. A positive file, on the other
hand, contains every customer's number and either clears the customer for business or
rejects him depending on the information in the file. This kind of file is generally regarded as more efficient and secure.
153. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1974).
154. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1975).
155. 39 Fed. Reg.44416, 44417 (1974).
156. National Bank v.Saxon, 268 F.Supp. 720, 723-24 (W.D.Pa. 1967).
157. Id. at 723-24.
158. Id. at 723-24.
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EFTS on the whole banking structure and to propose a cohesive plan for their
development.
CBCTs are the forerunners of a family of customer operated electronic terminals. Whether they constitute branches under the McFadden Act will depend upon the construction given the statute. Although a functional interpretation of the definition might insure a continuation of the "competitive
equality" among our banks begun in 1863, a revision of the McFadden Act
might be the best solution. The modernization of the banking system should
not be impeded by a 1927 law. The most important consideration is determining how our banking system should develop and what competitive balances we wish to maintain. Technology can revolutionize banking. Its implementation, however, should be carefully scrutinized to prevent a chaotic,
piecemeal construction of a new banking industry.
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